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Abstract. An example put forward by Dawkins to describe the evolution of strategies in the conflict 
of the  sexes over parental investment is discussed by means of a  simple dynamic system. It is shown 
that the equilibrium of the strategies is not evolutionarily stable, but equal  to  the  time  average  of 
the endlessly oscillating strategies. 
The theory of games and the notion of evolution- 
arily stable strategies, as introduced by Maynard 
Smith  &  Price  (1973),  has  proved  to  be  very 
helpful for the understanding  of the  evolution 
of  animal  conflicts.  Recently,  Zeeman  (1979), 
Taylor  &  Jonker  (1978)  and  Hofbauer  et  al. 
(1979) have used a  class of ordinary differential 
equations which makes the underlying dynamics 
of this approach more explicit. In this paper we 
show how to use this method to investigate situ- 
ations leading to oscillations of genetically influ- 
enced  social  behaviour.  Within  the  context  of 
Trivers's (1972)  theory of parental  investment, 
we  shall  discuss  an  example  introduced  by 
Dawkins  (1976) and  also  described by Wickler 
& Seibt (1977). 
Suppose that the pure strategies for contests 
within one species are labelled 1,...,  n and that 
aij  is  the  payoff for the  player using  the  pure 
strategy  i  when  his  adversary  uses  the  pure 
strategy j. Then ~  a~jq~ is the payoff for the pure 
J 
strategy i against the mixed strategy given by the 
probability  vector  q =  (q~ .....  qn),  and 
algpiq~ is  the  payoff  for  the  strategy  p  = 
t,j 
(P 1 .....  pn) played against q. Let A denote the 
payoff matrix (aig) and let 
S, =  (x =  (Xl .....  x,)  ~ rR n : Zxj =  1, 
J 
x~ >  0 for all i} 
be the simplex of all possible strategies. 
A  strategy p~S~  is  called  an  evolutionarily 
stable  strategy if, whenever a  population using 
this  strategy is perturbed by a  mutation  intro- 
ducing a  small population  with  strategy q #p, 
thenp fares better (in the new, mixed population) 
than  does q.  Equivalently,  in  the  definition of 
Maynard  Smith  (1978), p  is  an  evolutionarily 
stable  strategy if for  all q  #  p  one has p.Ap >_ 
q.Ap, with p.Aq >  q.Aq in the case of equality. 
In the words  of Selten (1980), p  is a  best reply 
against itself, and fares better against any alter- 
native best reply q, than does q against itself. 
If the  strategies  are  genetically  determined, 
then the success of strategy i will be reflected in 
its  success  in  reproduction,  i.e.  its  rate  of in- 
crease.  In  a  population  with  strategy  x  = 
(x 1, ￿9 ￿9 ￿9 ￿9 ,xn) the payoff for strategy i is 
Ymjxj 
i 
while the average payoff is 
ak~xkxj 
k,j 
It is natural to assume that the rate of increase 
5c~/x~ is equal to the difference between these two 
payoffs. Thus we obtain the system of ordinary 
differential  equations 
:e~ =  x~(Ya~jxj --  Y  x~a~jxj)  i= 1 ...... n  (1) 
j  k,j 
on the state space S•.  (It is easy to check that the 
simplex S~ and its faces are invariant for (1).) It 
can be shown quite simply (see Hofbauer et al. 
1979  or  Zeeman  1979)  that  if  p~Sn  is  an 
evolutionarily  stable  strategy,  then  p  is  an 
equilibrium state of (1) which is asymptotically 
stable (all orbits in the neighbourhood ofp con- 
verge to p). The converse is not true, however. 
Let us now consider an aspect of the 'battle of 
sexes', as described by Dawkins  (1976).  At the 
moment of conception, the female invests more 
in the offspring than the male since her gametes 
are larger. The father is faced with the tempta- 
tion to leave her 'holding the baby' and to look 
for a new mate. The female should prevent this 
by choosing a faithful husband, and the simplest 
way to do this would be to insist on a long en- 
gagement period in order to test the fidelity and 
the perseverance of her mate. Thus it would pay 
for her to be coy.  A  deserting male,  among  a 
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population  of coy  females,  will  have  to  face 
another long and  arduous courtship. This puts 
a  selective  pressure  on  males  to  be  faithful. 
Among  faithful  males,  however,  a  fast female 
would fare better than a coy one, since she skips 
the  courtship.  Her genes will  therefore spread. 
If  there  are  too  many  fast  females  around, 
however, then philandering males will find rich 
pickings and spread in their turn. But in a popu- 
lation where faithful husbands are rare, a female 
would do well to be prudent and coy. So we are 
back  at  the  beginning.  As  Maynard  Smith  & 
Price  (1973)  have  shown  in  their  well-known 
model  of  'hawks'  and  'mice',  a  superficially 
similar situation does not lead to oscillations but 
to convergence towards an evolutionarily stable 
equilibrium.  In  the  example  of  Dawkins, 
however,  we  shall  indeed  obtain  endless  oscil- 
lations. 
For our model, we shall use the same numeri- 
cal values as did Dawkins (1976) and Wickler & 
Seibt (1977): the benefit for raising a  child suc- 
cessfully is  +  15 for each parent; the total costs 
for looking  after the  child  are  -- 20;  and  the 
cost of a  prolonged courtship is.-- 3.  The gist 
of the model is largely independent of the actual 
choice of numerical values. Males have the two 
strategies  X1  (faithful)  and  ~ir2  (philanderer); 
females have the two strategies  Y1 (coy) and  Yz 
(fast). 
If a faithful male meets a coy female, then the 
payoff for both of them is  +  2  (namely  +  15 
(the child) -- 10 (they share the costs of looking 
after it)  -- 3 (the courtship)). If a  faithful male 
encounters a fast female, the courtship is omitted 
and  both  earn  +  5.  But  a  philandering  male 
meeting a  fast female makes off with  +  15 (no 
costs for him),  while the  female gets  -- 5  (she 
has to bear all the costs of raising a  child). If a 
philanderer meets a coy female, nothing happens, 
so the payoff for both is 0. 
More generally, suppose that aij is the payoff 
for a  male  using  strategy  Xi  against  a  female 
playing  strategy  Yj,  and  b,~  the  payoff for  a 
female using strategy  Yi against a  male playing 
strategy  Xj  (i,  j=  1,  2).  Thus  the  game  is 
described by the two matrices A and B. Let xi be 
the proportion of males playing strategy Zt, and 
y,  be  that  of females  playing  strategy  Y,,  for 
i=  1,  2.  Obviously  xl  +x2=yl  +Y2=  1, 
and x~ >  0, y~ >  0 for i ~- 1, 2. The payoff for a 
male using  strategy X,  against  a  female popu- 
lation described by (Yl, Y2) is 
ailyl  +  ai2Y2  (2) 
and  the  average payoff for a  male  population 
(xl, x2) against a  female population (Yl, Y2) is 
allxlyl  +  a12xlY2 +  a21x2y1 +  a22x2Y2.  (3) 
The  expressions  for  the  payoff expected  by 
females  are  similar. In  Dawkins's example, the 
two matrices are 
The payoff for faithful males is 2yl +  5y2, the 
payoff for philanderers is 15y2, and these payoffs 
are  equal  if and  only  if (Yl,  Y2) =  (-~, ~)-  It 
follows  that  the  payoff for  any  male  strategy 
(Xl, x2) against the female strategy (-~, ~) is the 
same, namely 2.5. A  similar computation shows 
that the payoff for any female strategy (Yl, Y2) 
against  the  male  strategy  (xl,  x2)=  (~,  ~)  is 
always  1.25.  Thus  indeed  it  pays  for  neither 
male nor female population to deviate from the 
equilibrium state given by the male population 
(~, ~).  (~, ~) and the female population  "~  1 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  there  is  no 
penalty for deviating either. Our players are not 
rational. There is no conspiracy to stick to the 
equilibrium.  If a  fluctuation  changes,  say,  the 
male population from (~, 3) to (Xl, x2), then its 
payoff  against  the  female  population  (~,  ~) 
remains 2.5. The payoff for the  female popula- 
tion (-~, ~),  however,  will  change  to -~  (3x I -- 
x2),  and  will  therefore  decrease  if  the  pro- 
portion  X l  of  faithful  males  has  been  de- 
creased by the fluctuation. There is no selection 
pressure  on  the  males  to  change  strategy, 
but there is on the females, rewarding an increase 
of the  proportion  Y2  of fast  females.  If,  for 
example, the new male population is (~, ~), then 
the  'old'  female  strategy has  as  payoff ~.  The 
female  strategy  11  (~,  ~),  for  example,  has  a 
higher payoff, namely 11 
Another way to see why the equilibrium pair 
(~, ~) and (~, ~) is not stable is as follows. The 
state of  the 'total' population (males and females) 
is  obviously described by Xl  and Yl,  and  thus 
by a point q =  (x, y) of the unit square 
Q2 =  {(x, y)era2:0  _< x  _<  1,0  _< y  <  1} 
where  x  =  x l  and  y =  Y l.  The  equilibrium 
population,  as found by Dawkins,  is  described 
by the point p  =  (~, ~).  Let us define the payoff 
for a  total population as the sum of the payoff 
for  the  males  and  the  payoff for the  females. 
Then a simple computation shows that the payoff 
for population q =  (x, y) against the equilibrium 188  ANIMAL  BEHAVIOUR,  29,  1 
population  p  =  (~,  ~)  is  independent  of  q, 
namely 
E(q,p) =  3.75 
But the  payoff for population p  against  popu- 
lation q is given by 
Efp,q) =  ~  (95  +  40x -- 90y) 
while the payoff for q against itself is 
E(q,q)----- 10 -- 10y -- 4xy 
Hence 
E(p,q) -- E(q,q) =  4(x -- {) (~ -- y) 
It  follows  that  if either  x  >  ~  and  y  >  {,  or 
x  <  {  and y  <  {, one has 
E(q,q) >  E(p,q) 
In this  case, q  is an alternative best reply to p, 
but  q  fares  better  against  itself  than  does  p 
against q. Hence the population p  =  (~, -~) is not 
evolutionarily stable. 
We  shall  presently  see  that  the  equilibrium 
p  =  ({,  ~) is  still highly relevant,  and  stable in 
another  sense.  It  turns  out,  indeed,  that  the 
populations will oscillate, but have p  as a mean. 
We shall need slightly more complex arguments 
to prove this. 
Let  us  first  set  up,  in  general  context,  the 
differential equations corresponding to the game 
given by the two matrices A  and B. We do this 
by simply mimicking the  way of obtaining  (1). 
The  rate  of increase  .~l/xl  of the  population 
using strategy X1, for example, will be just the 
difference  between  the  payoff for  strategy  X1 
(given  by  (2))  and  the  average payoff for  the 
males (given by (3)). Hence 
X1  ~- xl(allYl  +  a12Y2 -- (allxlYl  + 
al2xlY2 +  a21x2Yl  +  a22x2Y2)) 
Similarly 
X2 z  x2(a21Y 1  +  a22Y 2  -- 
(allXlYl  +  al2xlY2 +  a21x2Yl  +~ a22x2Y2)) 
351 =Yl  (bllXl  +  b12x2-- 
(bllXlyl  +  blzylx2  +  bzlyZXl  +  b22y2x2)) 
352  =  Y2 (b21Xl  +  b22x2  --  (5) 
(bllxlyl  +  b12YlX2 +  bzlxlY2  +  b22Y2X2)) 
This system of equations can be greatly simplified. 
First  of  all,  one  has  (Xl  +  x2)'=  0  if 
Xl+X2=  1, and(yl  +Y2)'=0ifyl  +y2= 
1.  Thus,  reasonably  enough,  the  set which  in- 
terests  us (satisfying the  conditions  Xl  +  x2 = 
1, Yl  +  Y2 =  1, x,  >  0, y~ >  0  for i =  1,  2)  is 
invariant.  We  may henceforth  consider  the  re- 
striction of (5) to this set. 
Next,  one can easily check that  by adding  a 
constant to each of the columns of A and B, one 
does not change the restriction  of (5). Thus we 
can,  without  restricting  generality,  assume 
For  Dawkins's  example  (4),  for  instance,  we 
obtain,  by adding the  constants  -- 2  and  -- 15 
to  the  first  and  second  column  of A,  and  by 
adding  the  constants  -- 2  and  +  5  to the  first 
and second column of B, the matrices 
Finally,  remember that  we  are  only  interested 
in two variables, say xl and Yl, which we again 
denote  by x  and  y.  Then,  after  a  short  com- 
putation, (5) becomes 
k  =  x(1 -- x) (a -- (a +  b)y)  (7) 
35 =  y(1 -- y) (c -- (c +  d)x) 
which we consider on the unit square  Q 2. 
This  square  and  its  edges  (corresponding  to 
pure  strategies)  are  invariant.  There  exists  a 
unique equilibrium 
(c  c 
P~-  , 
+d  a 
in the interior  of Q2 if and only if ab >  0  and 
cd >  0. If this is not the case, then (7) is trivial, 
since 2  or 35 will never change sign.  In this case 
x or y will be either constant, or else monotonic. 
Thus from now on we shall only consider the 
the case with unique  equilibrium.  The Jacobian 
of (7), evaluated at P, is 
J= 
cd  [  -] 
0  -- (a + b) (c + d)2 
ab 
-- (c +  d)~  0 
(a + b)  2 
If ac >  0,  the  eigenvalues  of  J  are  real  num- 
bers zk ~, where 
, 
X  --  abed 
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x 
In this case P  is a saddle. The theory of Poincar~ 
& Bendixson implies that there is no closed orbit 
in  Q2. Depending on the sign of a, either (0, 13) 
and  (1,  1),  or  (I,  0)  and (0,  1)  are  sinks,  and 
almost all orbits in the interior of Q2 will have 
these  sinks  as ~-limits (see  Fig.  1 for a  typical 
phase portrait). 
If ac <  0,  we  see  that  the  eigenvalues  of  J 
are  4- iL, and hence on the imaginary axis. We 
may assume, up to time reversal, that a  is nega- 
tive. Then b  is also negative, while c  and d  are 
positive.  The  numerical  values  chosen  by 
Dawkins correspond to this situation.  Equation 
(7) is then 
2=x(1--x)(--  10  +  12y)  (8) 
=  y  (1-- y) (5 -- 8x) 
and P  is the equilibrium (~, 3). 
The function 
V(x, y) =  x c (1  -- x)ay --a  (1  -- y) -b 
vanishes on the boundary of Q2, is strictly posi- 
tive in  the  interior  and  has P  as unique  maxi- 
mum.  It  is  easy  to  check  that  1? =  0.  (This 
means that if x(t) and y(t) are solutions  of (7), 
then  the  time-derivative  of  the  function  t-+ 
V(x(t), y(t)), given by (c~ V/3x) 2  +  (~ V/3y) fi,  is 
equal  to 0.) It follows that  V is constant along 
every orbit. The orbits are closed and correspond 
to the constant value levels of V (see Fig. 2 for 
1 
_-￿ 
Fig.  I.  Phase  portrait  of  the  equation  2  =  x  (1  -- x) 
(10 --  12y), j~ =  y  (1  -- y) (5  -- 8x). 
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Fig.  2.  Phase  portrait  of  the  equation  2  --  x  (1  --  x) 
(--  10+12y),5,=y(1  -- y) (5  --  8x). 
the phase portrait  corresponding  to  Dawkins's 
example). 
The equilibrium P  is stable (every neighbour- 
hood  U of P  contains a  neighbourhood  U' such 
that no orbit issued in  U' leaves U), but it is not 
asymptotically  stable,  and  a  fortiori  not  evo- 
lutionarily  stable. 
Thus  the  model of Dawkins  leads to  endless 
oscillations.  Even  if the  system had  started  at 
equilibrium,  small  mutations  would  be  bound 
to  occur and  would  soon  have  sent it  into  an 
oscillatory state. 
The  equilibrium  P  is  nevertheless  most  im- 
portant,  because  it  corresponds  to  the  time- 
average  along  every  orbit.  Indeed,  the  first 
equation of (7) can be written 
2 
=  a  -- (a +  b)y 
xO  -  x) 
The left-hand  side is just the time derivative of 
log (x/(1 -- x)). If we integrate along an orbit of 
period T, and note that x  (0) =  x(T), we obtain 
x(t)  ] T  r 
0 =  log  =  aT--(a+b)  f.  y(t)dt 
1  -  x(t)]'  =  o  o 
and hence, dividing by T, 
1  r  a 
--  I  y( t )dt - 
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and similarly  and the payoff for the females by 
I  T  C 
--  I  y(t)dt = 
T  o  c+d 
This  time-average,  then,  is  independent of the 
initial conditions. It is not affected by mutations. 
Moreover,  it  corresponds  to  actual  measure- 
ments. If, for example, one studies a population 
of grey geese for a very long time and finds that 
60 ~o of the males are faithful (see, e.g. Wickler 
&  Seibt  1977), then one is dealing with a  time 
average rather than with an evohitionarily stable 
state. 
Other  authors,  for example  Maynard  Smith 
&  Parker  (1976),  Maynard  Smith  (1977), 
Grafen &  Sibly (1978) and Taylor (1979), have 
also studied animal conflicts between two popu- 
lations  by  using  the  game-theoretic  approach. 
Our differential equations apply to some of their 
models. Here, we only consider a contest between 
male  and female of one insect species,  as  des- 
cribed by Parker (1979).  In a  given encounter, 
males  are  often  under  selection  to  mate,  and 
simultaneously  females  are  under  selection  to 
refuse mating. A  sex-limited gene gives a  com- 
petitive mating advantage M  to males,  but the 
male behaviour associated with the gene inflicts 
some  cost  --R  upon  the  female  (e.g.  direct 
damage)  which  may  be  felt  by  the  progeny. 
Parker  assumes  that  the  females  have  two 
strategies,  namely  to  reject,  Y1,  or  to  remain 
passive,  ]12; the males have also two strategies, 
namely to persist,  X1,  or not,  X2.  Let -- S  be 
the cost for the female if the male persists,  and 
--  U  the  cost  of persistence for the  male.  We 
shall assume that the probability of a  mating in 
an  encounter between  a  passive  female  and  a 
non-persisting male is ￿89 and the probability of a 
mating  in  an  encounter  between  a  rejecting 
female and a persistent male is r. 
The payoff matrix for the  males is  given by 
X I  rM- U  M 
x  2  o  M_ 
2 
X I  )(2 
YI  -$-rR  0 
R 
Thus we use the two matrices 
A=  B= 
U-- rM  R(I -- r) +  S 
The condition for mixed equilibrium, ab >  0 and 
cd >  0, is now 
U  S 
r<--andr>  1-- 
M  R 
The fixed point, then, is a  saddle  (ac <  0) and 
we have the situation depicted in Fig.  1. In this 
case,  the  outcome-  which  sex will  win-  de- 
pends on the initial condition. 
Parker (1979) also describes in this context an 
'opponent-independent  costs'  game  which, 
although  not  directly  describable  in  terms  of 
equation  (7),  possesses  some  similar  features. 
Each  population  has  six  different  strategies, 
corresponding  to  different  levels  of escalation 
(and thus of cost). Here, numerical simulations 
lead to what Parker calls 'unresolvable evolution- 
ary chases', i.e. there is no evolutionarily stable 
strategy,  but  the  frequencies  of  the  various 
strategies fluctuate. Thus Parker seems to have 
been the first to consider the possibility of end- 
lessly  oscillating  behaviour.  He  cautions  that 
'it is  extremely difficult to know whether such 
cyclical chases exist in nature'. 
We close with a few remarks. 
Von  Neumann  &  Morgenstern  (1953)  have 
already  stressed  that  their  theory  of games  is 
thoroughly  static.  In  a  study  of evolution,  a 
more dynamic theory seems to be preferable, and 
this  is not  only from a  mathematical point  of 
view.  The  simple  biological  example  in  this 
paper shows how ordinary differential equations 
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Fig. 3.  A trajectory  of the  same dynamical system as  in  Fig. 2,  with 
random fluctuations superimposed. 
fully discussed  in  static  terms  alone.  It  seems 
that, at least for asymmetric contests, the notion 
of evolutionarily stable strategy has to be sup- 
plemented by a more dynamic approach. 
Equations  (1)  and  (7)  are  not  very different 
from familiar  equations  in  theoretical ecology. 
In  particular,  up  to  the  factors  (1-  x)  and 
(1 -- y), equation (8) looks just like an equation 
of Lotka-Volterra type describing the evolution 
of two populations of predator and prey (see for 
example, Hirsch & Smale 1974). Here again, the 
unique  equilibrium  is  surrounded  by  periodic 
orbits  and  is  equal  to  the  time-average  along 
these orbits. 
Equation (8), of course, reflects only part of 
the dynamics underlying the model of Dawkins. 
Superimposed  on  the  deterministic  dynamical 
system (8) is a  stochastic process corresponding 
to mutations.  The evolution of the  system will 
then be described by paths consisting of pieces 
of orbits of (8) and small random perturbations. 
In Fig.  3 we have simulated such an evolution 
by  computer.  The  picture  is  reminiscent  of 
Brownian motion and shows that (8) is in some 
ways  quite  unpredictable.  The  time  average, 
however,  is  not  affected by  the  perturbations. 
Briefly, then,  we  can  draw  two  conclusions: 
(a)  that  the  battle  of  sexes  has  much  in 
common with predation; and 
(b) that the behaviour of lovers is  oscillating 
like the moon, and unpredictable as the weather. 
Of course, people didn't need differential equa- 
tions  to notice this  before. 
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